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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are professors of law who teach and write about constitutional law.
They have substantial expertise in the text, history, and structure of the Constitution, as well as Supreme Court’s decisions relating to the legislative authority of
the federal government. Their legal expertise thus bears directly on the constitutional issues before the Court in this case.1
Amici are:
 Jack M. Balkin, Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First
Amendment, Yale Law School
 Gillian E. Metzger, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School
 Trevor W. Morrison, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School
Institutional affiliations are provided for identification purposes only.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) establishes a comprehensive regime to
address a growing crisis in uncompensated health care services. Prior to passage of
the ACA, uninsured individuals frequently obtained healthcare services without
fully paying for them—a widespread practice that imposed systemic burdens and
cost-shifting. Providing these uncompensated services to the uninsured cost the
1

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5), amici affirm that no counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person other than amici and its
counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. Counsel for
all parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
-1-
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American healthcare system $43 billion in 2008—a cost that was substantially subsidized by the government; the remainder of that cost was passed on to private insurers,

insured

families,

and

employers.

See

Pub.

L.

No.

111-148,

§§ 1501(a)(2)(F), 10106(a); Jack Hadley et al., Covering the Uninsured in 2008:
Current Costs, Sources of Payment, and Incremental Costs, Health Affairs W403W406 (Aug. 25, 2008), cited in H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, pt. 2, 111th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 983 (2010).
Healthy individuals’ failure to purchase health insurance thus produces increased premium rates for those who do purchase insurance as well as increased
costs to the government. Moreover, because some aspects of the ACA, such as the
ban on denying coverage based on preexisting conditions, see Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§§ 1501(a)(2), 10106(a)(I), could increase healthy individuals’ incentives not to
obtain insurance, enacting those provisions without providing an incentive for all
Americans to purchase insurance would likely have increased the economic burden
on those who buy insurance and on the government .
The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision challenged in this litigation addresses this critical problem by mandating that individuals either purchase a minimally adequate health insurance plan for themselves and their families or pay an
annual penalty. See ACA §§ 1501(b), 10106, amended by Pub. L. No. 111-152 §
1002, 124 Stat. 1029, 1032 (2010), codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. The provi-

-2-
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sion—which imposes penalties as a percentage of income and is subject to several
exemptions, including lack of income and inability to pay—is a key component in
the ACA’s comprehensive statutory scheme, and plays an essential role in reducing
the cost of health insurance for all Americans.
Amici are confident that the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision is a permissible exercise of Congress’s power under the Interstate Commerce Clause, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. But the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision also falls squarely within the Constitution’s grant to Congress of the “Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Even if this Court were to
determine that the healthcare mandate exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, it should uphold the provision as a permissible exercise of Congress’s power under the separate and independent grant of legislative authority to
tax.
Congress’s taxing power is exceedingly broad. The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the taxing power’s reach and consistently held that a tax is valid so long as it serves the general welfare, is reasonably related to revenue raising,
and does not violate any independent constitutional prohibition. The Court has also
repeatedly affirmed that the taxing power is not limited to subjects within Congress’s other enumerated powers and that a tax is not invalid simply because it has

-3-
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a regulatory purpose or effect. The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision plainly satisfies the standard for legitimate exercises of the taxing power.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the contention that an
enactment may be sustained under the taxing power only if Congress expressly invoked that authority or only if Congress used the term “tax” in referring to the provision. If the enactment is in fact a tax—if it is a “pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property for the purpose of supporting the Government” (United States
v. New York, 315 U.S. 510, 515-16 (1942))—it may be sustained under the taxing
power regardless of the label that Congress employed.
The Taxing Clause is admittedly not without its limits: the Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax, shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.2 But that limitation has no application here. The
Supreme Court has long restricted the category of taxes subject to the Direct Tax
Clause to taxes upon real property, taxes upon personal property, and capitation
taxes—none of which describes the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision.

2

A second constitutional limit on the taxing power—the requirement that “all
Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States,” U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1—is not implicated here.
-4-
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TAXING POWER IS A BROAD AND INDEPENDENT GRANT
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The Supreme Court has long emphasized the wide scope of Congress’s tax-

ing power, describing it as “extensive,” License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462,
471 (1867), “exhaustive,” Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 12 (1916),
and “virtually without limitation,” United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 79
(1983). It is thus well-settled that “the constitutional restraints on taxing are few,”
and that “[t]he remedy for excessive taxation is in the hands of Congress, not the
courts.” United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953), overruled in part on
unrelated grounds sub nom., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
The taxing power’s breadth is no accident. The fundamental problem that
doomed the Articles of Confederation was the Continental Congress’s lack of authority to tax individuals directly. Rather than levying taxes itself, the federal government was required to send the states “requisitions” for funds, with the amount
per state set “in proportion to the value of all land within each State.” Articles of
Confed. art. VIII (1781). The states were then expected to levy and collect taxes to
provide the requisitioned amount. They often failed to do so, however, and Congress had few means by which to enforce compliance. See generally Roger H.
Brown, Redeeming the Republic: Federalists, Taxation, and the Origins of the
Constitution (1993) (detailing the breakdown of requisitions).
-5-
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The failure of the requisition system, which ultimately “reduced the United
States to bankruptcy[,] * * * demonstrated the need of a central government that
should possess the power of taxation.” Charles J. Bullock, The Origin, Purpose
and Effect of the Direct-Tax Clause of the Federal Constitution I, 15 Pol. Sci. Q.
217, 218 (1900). Creating a federal government with a more robust taxing power
and adequate revenue thus became a major goal behind adoption of the Constitution. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 388 (1821); see also The Federalist No. 30 (Alexander Hamilton) in The Federalist Papers 188-90 (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); Brown, supra, at 3-8. As the Supreme Court has explained,
“nothing is clearer, from the discussions in the Convention and the discussions
which preceded final ratification by the necessary number of States, than the purpose to give this power to Congress, as to the taxation of everything except exports, in its fullest extent.” Veazie Bank, 75 U.S. at 540.
Against this recognized historical backdrop, the Court has rejected arguments that the taxing power is limited to subjects that Congress can reach under the
Commerce Clause or other grants of authority, as well as claims that a regulatory
purpose or effect renders a tax invalid. Instead, the Supreme Court has upheld
measures as valid exercises of the taxing power so long as they (1) serve the general welfare, (2) raise revenue, and (3) do not infringe any of the individual rights
protected elsewhere in the Constitution.

-6-
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A.

Congress May Enact Taxes That Have The Effect Of Regulating
Activities Not Subject To Regulation Under Congress’s Other
Enumerated Powers.

The Taxation Clause “delegates a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated” in Article I, Section 8, and therefore stands apart and is “not restricted by them.” United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738
(1950). The Supreme Court confirmed the independent status of the taxing power
early in the Nation’s history, in its 1867 decision in the License Tax Cases, 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) 462 (1867). Noting that “Congress has no power of regulation nor any
direct control” over “the internal commerce or domestic trade of the States,” it
nonetheless sustained under the tax power a federal statute requiring purchase of a
license before engaging in certain trades and businesses, even intrastate. Id. at 470471; see also Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44 (“Nor does a tax statute necessarily fail because it touches on activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate.”) Indeed, Appellants “acknowledge that a regulatory fee or penalty that might otherwise be invalid as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, might still be a
constitutional tax under the Taxing Power.” Appellants’ Br. 39.
The Court also has made clear that the fact that a tax is enacted primarily for
a regulatory purpose is irrelevant: “a tax is not any less a tax because it has a regulatory effect.” Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513. Indeed, “[i]t is beyond serious question
that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or

-7-
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even definitely deters the activities taxed.” 340 U.S. at 44; see also Kahriger, 345
U.S. at 27 (noting numerous instances in which the Court upheld taxes notwithstanding a manifest “intent to curtail and hinder, as well as tax”); Minor v. United
States, 396 U.S. 87, 98 n.13 (1969); United States v. One Ford Coupe Auto., 272
U.S. 321, 328 (1926).
For precisely this reason, the Supreme Court has long “held that the fact that
other motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power does not authorize
courts to inquire into that subject.” Doremus, 249 U.S. at 93. As long as “the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the exercise of the taxing authority
conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives which induced it.” Id.; see also Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513-14 (“Inquiry into
the hidden motives which may move (a legislature) to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of courts.”); A Magnano Co.
v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934) (substantially the same); McCray v. United
States, 195 U.S. 27, 59 (1904) (substantially the same).
To be sure, during the 1920s and 1930s, the Supreme Court did invalidate
some federal taxes on the ground that they had been adopted primarily to enforce
compliance with a regulatory program that fell outside of Congress’s enumerated
powers under the then-prevailing interpretation of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g.,
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1936); United States v. Constantine,

-8-
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296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66-68 (1922); Bailey v.
Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37-38 (1922). But the Court has since discredited those decisions, stating that it had abandoned its earlier “distinctions between
regulatory and revenue-raising taxes,” Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725,
741 n.12 (1974), and insisting that a tax remains valid “even though * * * the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary.” Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44.
Of course, even if those Lochner-era decisions retained some force today,
they would merely support invalidating as pretextual a levy so high that it
amounted to a coercive penalty to compel compliance with an entire regulatory
scheme that falls wholly outside Congress’s enumerated powers. That was the situation addressed by those decisions, and that is how the Court has interpreted them
since. E.g., Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 3. Absent such extreme circumstances, however,
those decisions do not license judicial second-guessing of Congress’s intentions in
enacting legitimate taxes.
Instead, any scrutiny the Court today devotes to the purposes underlying a
tax measure focuses on ensuring it is not a criminal imposition in disguise. See
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779-83 (concluding that tax on drugs constituted criminal
punishment and therefore violated the Double Jeopardy Clause). Acknowledging
this point, Appellants concede “that a levy, fee, or penalty can be a constitutional

-9-

Case: 10-2388 Document: 006110850770 Filed: 01/21/2011 Page: 17

tax even though it seeks to effect regulatory purposes in addition to revenuegeneration.” Appellants’ Br. 39.
B.

A Tax Is Constitutionally Valid If It (1) Serves The General Welfare, (2) Is Reasonably Related To Revenue Raising, And (3) Does
Not Infringe Any Constitutionally-Protected Individual Right.

Though broad, the taxing power is not unlimited. The Court has identified
three criteria that a levy must satisfy to be upheld as a tax.
The first criterion is evident from the text of the Constitution: To be valid, a
tax measure must raise funds that specifically “pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 663 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1891). Congress enjoys wide discretion to determine whether a tax
measure serves the general welfare. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937);
see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976).
Second, to fall within the tax power a measure must bear “some reasonable
relation” to the “raising of revenue,” United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93-94
(1919), even if the revenue actually produced is “negligible,” United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950); accord Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 28 (noting tax at issue
“produces revenue”); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937) (sustaining tax “productive of some revenue”); Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S.

-10-

Case: 10-2388 Document: 006110850770 Filed: 01/21/2011 Page: 18

394, 412 (1928) (requiring only a “motive * * * [and] effect * * * to secure revenue”); see also Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 353 (1928) (concluding any
“doubt as to the character” of a tax was removed when “what was a nominal tax
before was made a substantial one” because it raised $1 million per year).
Finally, the Supreme Court has also rejected tax measures that run afoul of
constitutional protections of individual rights, such as the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on double jeopardy. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 77879, 784 (1994); see also United States v. Alkhafaji, 754 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1985)
(invalidating wagering tax as violating Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination).
II.

THE MINIMUM COVERAGE FEE PROVISION IS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE TAX POWER.
A.

The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision Satisfies The Requirements For An Exercise Of The Taxation Power.

The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision satisfies the requirements for a valid
exercise of the tax power because it (1) provides for the general welfare, (2) raises
revenue, and (3) does not run afoul of any constitutionally-protected individual
right.
First, in determining whether a congressional enactment furthers the general
welfare, “courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress.” Dole, 483
U.S. at 207. As we have said, by encouraging individuals to purchase health insur-

-11-

Case: 10-2388 Document: 006110850770 Filed: 01/21/2011 Page: 19

ance the Minimum Coverage Provision alleviates the costs associated with providing uncompensated care to the uninsured, which in turn lowers health insurance
premiums. Such cost reductions and expansions in access to health insurance assuredly constitute contributions to the general welfare.
Second, the provision plainly constitutes a genuine revenue-raising measure.
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision will produce approximately $4 billion annually by 2017. See Letter from
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget Office, to the Honorable Nancy
Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 18, 2010), at tbl.4 at 2. Over
the course of the period 2010-2019, the provision will generate approximately $17
billion in revenue. See id. No more is needed to satisfy the revenue requirement.
See Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514 n.1 (upholding tax that raised $5400 in revenue in
1934—$88,000 in today’s dollars).
Undoubtedly, the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision also serves a regulatory
purpose in that it encourages individuals to purchase health insurance. But as we
have already explained (supra, at 7-8), the governing precedents make plain that a
regulatory purpose cannot invalidate a measure that is otherwise valid under the
taxing power. Moreover, even if the Lochner-era decisions retained some vitality,
they would not provide any basis for invalidating the tax here. Unlike the regulatory regimes at issue in those cases, the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision is not the

-12-
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sole basis on which the entire ACA is made operative. Instead, the ACA’s detailed
regulatory requirements are separately laid out and are easily sustainable in their
own right under Congress’s commerce and spending powers.
Nor is the Minimum Coverage Provision a secret criminal penalty in disguise. The amount of tax imposed is not a “heavy exaction” or otherwise disproportionate assessment. Bailey, 259 U.S. at 36. It cannot exceed the national average
premium for the lowest level of relevant qualified health plans on the newly
created health exchanges, and it is subject to exemptions based on low income and
inability to pay. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(b) (adding 26 U.S.C. §§
5000A(c)(1), (2), 5000A(e)(1), (2)) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1002).
The tax is in no way tied to criminal action, and the Secretary of Treasury not empowered to enforce the provision criminally. See id. § 1501(b) (adding 26 U.S.C.
§5000A(g)(2)); cf. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 780-83 (emphasizing high tax rate,
deterrent purpose, and criminal prohibition on underlying taxed activity in concluding tax represented a criminal penalty).
Indeed, the provision plainly lacks the punitive character of other measures
the Supreme Court has held to be penalties. All that the fee provision requires is
that those who forgo health insurance, and thereby impose costs on the federal
government and their fellow citizens, pay a tax at most roughly equivalent to the
amount they would otherwise expend purchasing insurance. By comparison, the
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provision deemed a penalty in United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators,
518 U.S. 213 (1996), imposed a tax of 110% in addition to the amount an employer owes for an underfunded pension plan. Id. at 225-226.
Third, the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision does not violate any individual
rights. No one has a right to be free from taxation, and Congress’s decision to target individuals who decide to forgo insurance is indisputably rational, given the
impact of their decision on the government and society as a whole. See Regan v.
Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) (“Legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.”).3
B.

The Taxation Clause Does Not Require Congress To Use Any Particular Labels Or Expressly Invoke The Taxation Power.

The Minimum Coverage Provision’s constitutionality under the tax power is
not affected by its denomination as a “penalty,” or by the absence of a reference to
the tax power in the statutory text.

3

Appellants suggest that even if the taxing power is applicable to the Fee
Provision, the obligation to buy insurance still must be sustained as a valid exercise
of the Commerce Clause. Appellants’ Br. 39-41. Their argument relies on separately analyzing Section 5000A(a) (the minimum coverage requirement) from Section
5000A(b) (the minimum coverage fee provision). But there is no basis for treating
these two subsections independently. Instead, the section as a whole creates a single federal tax. The minimum coverage requirement simply defines the taxpayers
which are subject to the tax. If Appellants were correct, the Supreme Court would
have erred in upholding the National Firearms Act without first determining
whether the provisions that triggered the tax obligation could be upheld under the
commerce power. Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513-514.
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1. The Supreme Court has expressly held that, in determining whether a
particular exaction is a tax, courts must “look[] behind the label placed on the exaction and rest[s] its answer directly on the operation of the provision.” Reorganized CF & I Fabricators, 518 U.S. at 220; see also Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941) (in “passing on the constitutionality of a tax law,” a
court is “concerned only with its practical operation, not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words which may be applied to it.”)
Indeed, the Supreme Court has long characterized legislative acts as “taxes,”
regardless of the precise labels used by Congress—including an exaction expressly
deemed a “penalty” in the Internal Revenue Code. See United States v. Sotelo, 436
U.S. 268, 275 (1978); see also The License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 474475 (“The granting of a license * * * must be regarded as nothing more than a
mere form of imposing a tax.”). This court has followed suit, most recently holding
that a legislative measure imposing fees for handicapped parking placards was a
tax. See Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d 608, 612-615 (6th Cir. 2000). Whether
the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision contains the express indicia of a tax is therefore not essential to finding it within the taxing power.
Yet those indicia are in fact present. The provision amends the Internal Revenue Code and references taxpayers and tax returns, requiring taxpayers to list information about their health insurance coverage on their annual returns. See Pub.
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L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b), 1502 (amending the Internal Revenue Code to include
26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A, 6055). Any amount due from the taxpayer under the provision is included with the taxpayer’s return and thus paid into general revenues,
along with any other tax that is due. See id. § 1502(b) (adding 26 U.S.C. §
5000A(b)(2)). This court has previously emphasized similar features in holding a
measure to be a tax. See Hedgepeth, 215 F.3d at 612-13 (emphasizing assessments
went into funds that served the general welfare). As the Second Circuit has said,
“[t]he placement” of a statutory provision within a subtitle “of the Internal Revenue Code,” together with “its granting of enforcement powers to the Secretary of
the Treasury”—as here—“provides a strong indication of Congress’s intent” that
the requirements under the provision be construed as taxes. In re Chateaugay
Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 498 (2d Cir. 1995).
Finally, that Congress listed other revenue raising provisions elsewhere in
the ACA, see Pub. L. No. 111-148, Title IX, provides no basis for disregarding
these other indicia indicating that the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision is a tax.
2. It is also clear that Congress need not expressly invoke its taxing power
in the text of the statute for the statute to be upheld as a permissible exercise of that
authority. “The constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on
recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.” Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller
Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243
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n.18 (1983) (stating in regard to Congress’s authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment that it is sufficient if the Court can “discern some legislative purpose
or factual predicate that supports the exercise of that power”); see also Timmer v.
Michigan Dep’t of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 840-16 (6th Cir. 1997) (sustaining
the Equal Pay Act’s abrogation of state sovereign immunity under Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment, § 5 authority even though Congress did not reference § 5
and only identified its commerce power as basis).
Here, even though not constitutionally required, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress understood the provision to function in part as a tax, and
to be supported by the tax power. See H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, pt. 1, at 265 (referring to the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision as imposing “[a] tax on individuals
who opt not to purchase health insurance”); see also J. Comm. on Taxation, 111th
Cong., Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the “Reconciliation Act
of 2010,” As Amended, in Combination with the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” XX (Mar. 21, 2010) (including Minimum Coverage Fee Provision in
its explanation of the revenue provisions of the ACA in combination with the Reconciliation Act).4 Moreover, several members of Congress expressly invoked the

4

And the revenue estimates for the provision were included in the Congressional Budget Office’s letters to Congressional leaders, just like other tax provisions, and not listed in the report of the Joint Committee on Taxation (“JCT”). See
JCT, Report JCX-10-10, at 3 n.1.
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tax power as a basis for enacting the Minimum Coverage Provision. See, e.g., 155
Cong. Rec. S13,751, S13,753 (Dec. 22, 2009) (Sen. Leahy); 155 Cong. Rec.
S13,558, S13,581-82 (Dec. 20, 2009) (Sen. Baucus).
III.

THE MINIMUM COVERAGE FEE PROVISION IS NOT A DIRECT
TAX SUBJECT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF
APPORTIONMENT.
The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision is not among the narrow class of tax-

es subject to the constitutional requirement of apportionment.
A.

The Apportionment Requirement Applies Only To Capitation
Taxes And Taxes On Property.

Under Article I, Section 9, “[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be
laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to
be taken.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. This apportionment requirement is the direct
result of a compromise over slavery. Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution subjected representation in the House of Representatives and direct taxes to the same
rule, which counted slaves as three-fifths of a person:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a
Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the delegates generally favored
apportioning representation in the House according to each state’s population, but
northern and southern delegates were deeply divided over whether and how to
count slaves for these purposes. James Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, in 5 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution, As Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, at 296-302 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1881) (hereinafter 5 Elliot’s Debates). A proposal was made to count slaves as three-fifths of a person, which was
subsequently extended to taxation as well. 5 Elliot’s Debates at 302. This “worked
as a compromise because the increased representation attributable to slaves came at
a cost to a state, an increased direct-tax liability for the state’s inhabitants.” Erik M.
Jensen, The Taxing Power: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution 27
(2005). But the idea of apportioning all federal taxes in this manner provoked concerns that it might result in the same failed system of state-specific requisitions that
had proven inadequate under the Articles of Confederation. See 5 Elliot’s Debates
at 302. To address this concern, Gouverneur Morris proposed “restraining the [apportionment] rule to direct taxation. With regard to indirect taxes on exports and
imports, and on consumption, the rule would be inapplicable.” 5 Elliot’s Debates at
302. That amendment was adopted, leading ultimately to the direct tax apportionment requirement as it now appears in Article I.
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The critical points from this history are twofold: first, the apportionment requirement was extended to taxation only to help secure the compromise over the
treatment of slaves for purposes of representation, see Edwin R.A. Seligman, The
Income Tax 552 (1914) (“[T]he introduction of the words ‘direct taxes’ had no reference to any dispute over tax matters, but was designed solely to solve the difficulty connected with representation * * *.”); and second, it was limited to direct
taxation precisely to ensure it would not interfere substantially with the broad taxing authority the framers intended to grant to the federal government, see Bullock,
supra, at 222 (the apportionment requirement was “not designed to injure * * * the
taxing power of the new government”). Recognizing as much, Justice Paterson
made clear in the Supreme Court’s first Direct Tax Clause case that the rule of apportionment “ought not to be extended by construction.” Hylton v. United States, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 178 (1796). Thus, although the precise meaning of “direct tax”
was obscure even at the Founding, the Court has consistently understood the class
of taxes subject to the apportionment requirement to be narrow.
Hylton sheds useful light on the provision at issue here. Writing seriatim, the
Justices suggested that only two kinds of taxes—capitation taxes and taxes on
land—clearly constituted direct taxes; they expressed serious doubt that any other
types of taxes fell within that category. As Justice Chase wrote,
I am inclined to think * * * that the direct taxes contemplated by the
Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply,
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without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance; and
a tax on LAND. I doubt whether a tax, by a general assessment of personal property, within the United States, is included within the term
direct tax.
3 U.S. at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.); see also id. at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.)
(“Whether direct taxes, in the sense of the Constitution, comprehend any other tax
than a capitation tax, and tax on land, is a questionable point.”); id. at 183 (opinion
of Iredell, J.) (“Perhaps a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution, can mean nothing but a tax on something inseparably annexed to the soil * * *. A land or a poll
tax may be considered of this description.”).
For the century that followed, the Supreme Court adhered to the narrow
view of direct taxes favored by the Hylton Justices. Tracing its precedents since
Hylton, the Court in 1881 concluded that “direct taxes, within the meaning of the
Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes
on real estate.” Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881). Accordingly,
the Court in the nineteenth century sustained unapportioned taxes on a variety of
forms of income and property on the ground that they qualified as excises, including taxes on insurance premiums, Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433
(1869), state bank notes, Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869), inheritances, Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1875), and income, Springer, 102
U.S. at 586. See Ackerman, supra, at 25.
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Of course, in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895),
the Supreme Court struck down the federal income tax on the ground that it was an
unapportioned direct tax. Yet while Pollock was a departure from an unbroken
string of decisions, even that case did not hold that all income taxes are direct taxes—it was limited to taxes on income derived from real and personal property.
(Pollock struck down the entire income tax because the absence of a severance
clause made it impossible to save the other parts of the tax. See id. at 635-37; Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 16-17.)
Pollock was an aberration that did not produce any longstanding expansion
in the apportionment requirement. The Court immediately cut back on the decision,
upholding a wide range of unapportioned taxes. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S.
41 (1900) (federal estate tax); Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608 (1902) (tax on manufacturing of tobacco); Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363 (1904) (stamp tax on
memorandum or contracts of sale of stock certificates); Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v.
McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904) (tax on sugar refining); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U.S. 107, 177 (1911) (corporate income tax).
More significantly, the Nation responded to Pollock by adopting the Sixteenth Amendment, providing that “Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among
the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.” U.S. Const.
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amend. XVI. As the Court later explained, “the Amendment was drawn for the
purpose of doing away for the future with the principle upon which the Pollock
Case was decided” by clarifying that all taxes on income are exempt from the apportionment requirement. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 18.5
Since the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, the Direct Tax Clause
has continued to be interpreted and applied in exceedingly narrowly circumstances.
In addition to capitation and land taxes, the Court has stated that certain taxes upon
personal property may also constitute direct taxes. The Court has never invalidated
a tax on the ground that it is an unapportioned capitation tax. As for property taxes,
the critical distinction between direct and indirect taxes on property is that the former are imposed upon the “general ownership of property,” whereas a tax on “a
particular use of property or the exercise of a single power over property incidental
to ownership, is an excise which need not be apportioned.” Bromley v. McCaughn,
280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929). On that basis, the Court has upheld a wide range of unapportioned taxes on the ground that they are not imposed on property itself. See,
e.g., Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945) (upholding an estate tax collected upon community property); Bromley, 280 U.S. at 138 (upholding a gift tax);

5

In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the Court held that an unapportioned tax on unrealized stock dividends was unconstitutional. But that case has
been largely confined to its facts. See Michael J. Graetz, The Decline (and Fall?)
of the Income Tax 285 (1997) (describing Macomber as “now archaic”).
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New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) (upholding an estate tax); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916) (upholding a tax on the annual production of mines); Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261 (1914) (upholding a tax
on foreign built yachts).
In sum, the Supreme Court’s cases embrace a consistently narrow understanding of the taxes subject to the Direct Tax Clause. As the D.C. Circuit recently
concluded, “[o]nly three taxes are definitely known to be direct: (1) a capitation
* * *, (2) a tax upon real property, and (3) a tax upon personal property.” Murphy
v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2007). That is indeed as expansively as the
Constitution’s reference to direct taxes can plausibly be construed. Relying on the
Court’s consistently narrow reading of the apportionment requirement, Congress
has not apportioned a tax since 1861. See Jensen, Taxing Power, supra, at 93.
There is no call for potentially jeopardizing the federal tax laws by expanding the
sweep of the Direct Tax Clause beyond its historical understanding.
B.

Because The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision Is Neither A Capitation Tax Nor A Tax On Property, There Is No Apportionment
Requirement.

Against this backdrop, the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision plainly is not
among the taxes subject to the requirement of apportionment. It is not a tax on the
“general ownership of property,” Bromley, 280 U.S. at 136, and thus is not the sort
of property tax covered by the Clause. Neither is it a capitation tax. As Justice Sto-
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ry explained in his Commentaries on the Constitution, “capitation taxes, or, as they
are more commonly called, poll taxes, [are] taxes upon the polls, heads, or persons,
of the contributors.” Story, supra, § 476. Such a tax is imposed on the person
“without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance.” Hylton, 3 U.S.
at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.). It is a tax on a person “because of the person’s existence.” Dodge, supra, at 841; see Black’s Law Dictionary 1222 (8th ed. 2005) (defining a poll tax or capitation tax as “a fixed tax levied on each person within a jurisdiction”).
The Supreme Court has never struck down a federal tax on the ground that
it is a capitation, and there is no basis for concluding that the Minimum Coverage
Fee Provision is the first such tax. Far from being imposed “without regard to
property, profession, or any other circumstance,” Hylton, 3 U.S. at 175 (opinion of
Chase, J.), it is instead based on very specific circumstances: the taxpayer’s failure
to pay premiums into a qualified health care plan in a given month, and the taxpayer’s ability to pay. Taxpayers’ option to purchase health insurance and remove
themselves from the tax obviously disqualifies the tax as a capitation tax. That disqualification follows also from the fact that the ACA exempts millions of individuals whose household incomes are below the threshold required for filing a tax return, members of Indian tribes, or individuals who may demonstrate “hardship.” 26
U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1), (2), (3), & (5). The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision thus
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is not a tax imposed “because of the person’s existence,” Dodge, supra, at 841, and
does not operate directly on any person or property. Instead, it applies only indirectly as a combined function of the person’s particular decisions and financial circumstances. See Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 502 (1930) (“A tax laid upon
the happening of an event, as distinguished from its tangible fruits, is an indirect
tax * * *.”).
The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision is therefore best understood as an
excise tax. As amici for Appellants explain, excise taxes are those that “‘apply to
activities, transactions, or the use of property’” and “‘do not apply directly to individuals for being.’” Amicus Br. of W. Legal Found., at 28 (quoting Steven J. Willis & Nakku Chung, Constitutional Decapitation & Healthcare, 128 Tax Notes
169, 182 (2010). That is the correct standard, but Appellants’ amici are simply
wrong to suggest that the Minimum Coverage Fee Provision is a tax on “individuals for being” or anything of the sort. Id. Instead, it is levied on the basis of decisions individuals make with respect to specific “transactions”—namely the decision to forgo purchasing health insurance. There are numerous examples of Congress taxing the failure to make a particular economic arrangement. See, e.g., 26
U.S.C. § 4974 (tax on failure of retirement plans to distribute assets); id. § 4980B
(tax on failure of group health plan to extend coverage to beneficiary); id. § 4980E
(tax on failure of employer to make comparable Archer MSA contributions). Those
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provisions are not subject to the apportionment requirement, and neither is the
Minimum Coverage Fee Provision.
As we have said, people without health insurance consume billions of dollars in medical services annually, and, in aggregate, cannot pay the total cost of
those services. Congress determined that a substantial portion of those costs are
passed on “to private insurers, which pass on the cost to families” with health insurance. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F). Against this background of health care insurers and insured families absorbing costs associated with the provision of health
care services to the uninsured, Congress determined to tax the economic decision
to forgo health insurance. The Minimum Coverage Fee Provision is thus linked not
only to an individual’s decision not to purchase health insurance, but also to the
aggregate phenomenon of uninsured individuals accessing health care services.
There is no basis in precedent or principle for subjecting this tax to the constitutional requirement of apportionment.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
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